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Abstract Software agents can be members of different institutions along their
life; they might even belong to different institutions simultaneously. For these
reasons, agents need capabilities that allow them to determine the repercussion
that their actions would have within the different institutions. This associa-
tion between the physical word, in which agents’ interactions and actions take
place, and the institutional world is defined by means of constitutive norms.
Currently, the problem of how agents reason about constitutive norms has
been tackled from a theoretical perspective only. Thus, there is a lack of more
practical proposals that allow the development of software agents capable of
reasoning about constitutive norms. In this article we propose an informa-
tion model, knowledge representation and an inference mechanism to enable
Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents to reason about the consequences of their
actions on the institutions and making decisions accordingly. Specifically, the
information model, knowledge representation and inference mechanism pro-
posed in this paper allows agents to keep track of the institutional state given
that they have a physical presence in some real-world environment. Agents
have a limited and not fully believable knowledge of the physical world (i.e.,
they are placed in an uncertain environment). Therefore, our proposal also
deals with the uncertainty of the environment.
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1 Introduction
The term norm has been traditionally used in the multi-agent system (MAS)
area to refer to regulative norms [7] that define patterns of behaviour aimed at
regulating the actions of software agents and the interactions among them1.
However, norms can be employed in MAS not only for regulation issues, but
also for establishing social institutions that give rise to new types of facts.
These facts are called institutional facts since they only make sense within
institutions [32]. This type of norms is known as constitutive norms since they
create the institutional reality; i.e., they regulate the creation of institutional
facts. “Raising your arm in an auction counts as bidding” is a well-known
example of constitutive norm.
Traditionally, constitutive norms have been used as bricks for building the
ontology of institutions [20]. These contextual ontologies define a link between
abstract concepts in which regulative norms are defined to the brute facts that
take place in the application domain. Thus, constraints aimed at achieving the
desired behaviour (i.e., the regulative norms) are specified at a higher abstract
level (i.e., in terms of institutional facts) in order to allow different situations
to be controlled through a reduced set of norms [1,35].
We claim that constitutive norms are not only simple bricks for building
institutional ontologies used on the definition of regulative norms, but they also
allow agents to infer the consequences of their actions over the institutional
state (e.g., constitutive norms allow agents to know that they cannot raise
their arm in an auction if they do not want to make a bid). As a consequence,
agents need to consider constitutive norms not only for translating abstract
regulative norms into specific ones, but also for selecting the most suitable
actions according to their goals and the institutional repercussions [20].
For example, a virtual assistant agent that imitates the behaviour of a
human seller must be endowed with capabilities that allow it to participate
in different and, even unknown, e-markets such as eBAY2 or Amazon3. Each
e-market is an institution that has constitutive norms that define the protocols
and ontology that is used within this institution. For example, an actual e-
market might have its own constitutive norms that define the process by which
purchase contracts are formalised, the mechanism that must be used to open
a new auction, etc. As a consequence, the virtual assistant agent requires
capabilities for reasoning about constitutive norms and knowing the specific
mechanisms and protocols by which the trading operations are performed in
1 The norm concept has been ambiguously employed inside the MAS area as a synonym
of law, guideline, criterion, social expectation, etc. For a review of the different definitions
given to the norm concept see [15].
2 http://www.ebay.com
3 http://www.amazon.com
Reasoning About Constitutive Norms in BDI Agents 3
each market. These capabilities are also required in scenarios controlled by
constitutive norms such as: social simulation scenarios, environments in which
humans and agents interact in a realistic way, scenarios in which humans
delegate tasks to personal software agents, and so on. In these scenarios, agents
should represent constitutive norms explicitly to be able to determine if they
are relevant and take these norms into account to make decisions accordingly.
In the literature, several proposals have been made in order to define agents
endowed with capabilities for reasoning about regulative norms [10,14,26].
However, the role of constitutive norms in agent reasoning has not been con-
sidered in depth and there is a lack of agent decision making procedures that
consider constitutive norms.
This paper answers one main question: “Is it possible to develop agents that
consider the institutional state by reasoning about constitutive norms?”. This
question entails the development of agents that are capable of reasoning about
constitutive norms and determining the changes that occur in the institutional
state. A suitable solution to this problem must take into account the fact that
agents are situated in the real world. Thus, agents have uncertain knowledge
about the current state of their environment.
In this paper, we propose to endow BDI agents with an information model,
knowledge representation and an inference mechanism for reasoning about con-
stitutive norms. Thus, our proposal brings agents the possibility of reasoning
about the possible interpretations of their actions within different institutions
and making decisions accordingly. Finally, we performed some experiments to
evaluate the usefulness of our approach when it is used to reason about con-
stitutive norms in uncertain environments. Specifically, these experiments are
aimed at determining to what extent our proposal allows agents situated in
uncertain environments to keep track of the institutional state.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes some related work;
Section 3 provides the basic definitions used in this paper; Section 4 describes
the information model, knowledge representation and inference mechanisms
for reasoning about constitutive norms; Section 5 describes the main agent
types that can be defined with our proposal; Section 6 contains an example
that illustrates how our proposal enables BDI agents to represent and reason
about constitutive norms; Section 7 describes the different experiments that
we carried out; and Section 8 concludes the paper and discusses some possible
directions for future work.
2 Related Work
The notion of constitutive norm was defined by philosophy in [29]. In this
work, Rawls introduces the notion of constitutive norms (or constitutive rules4
4 Note that constitutive norms have been also called constitutive rules. For example,
Rawls and Searle refer to them by using the term constitutive rules. Within the MAS field
the term constitutive norm has been widely used [7,34,30]. Given that our proposal belongs
to the MAS field, we have adopted the term constitutive norm in this article.
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according to Rawls’s terminology) as rules that define the very institutions.
However, the most well-known and referred proposal on constitutive norms
was made by Searle in [33,31,32]. In these papers Searle proposes a classifica-
tion of norms into regulative and constitutive ones. Regulative norms regulate
forms of behaviour that exist independently and antecedently to them. Con-
stitutive norms create or define these forms of behaviour controlled by regula-
tive norms. In particular, constitutive norms define the count-as relationship
which defines how the institutional world (i.e., the institutional facts) is built
in terms of actions or state of affairs occurring in the physical world (i.e., brute
facts). Therefore, constitutive norms specify under which conditions a brute
fact count-as an institutional fact.
In the Artificial Intelligence field, the modelling of the count-as relationship
has been introduced by Jones and Sergot in [24]. In this work, they propose
the formalization of the count-as relationship in any action logic by means of
the ⇒s operator. In this sense, the expression X ⇒s Y means that “within
the context s occurrence of X count-as Y ”. In the existing literature, several
variations of the ⇒s operator have been proposed [21,18,20]. For example, in
[21] Grossi and Dignum have proposed an alternative definition of the count-as
connective for dealing with non-monotonicity. Mainly, they propose to redefine
X ⇒s F as “in context s,X count-as Y if it is not inconsistent”. Governatori et
al. propose in [18] to model both the count-as connective and other normative
links by means of a unique non-monotonic conditional. In [22], Grossi et al.
used modal logic to capture distinct meanings of the count-as relationship.
In the MAS field, constitutive norms are used as bricks for building the
ontology of institutions [20]. These contextual ontologies define a link between
abstract concepts in which regulative norms are defined to the brute facts
that take place in the application domain. According to this view of constitu-
tive norms as an abstraction mechanism for allowing the definition of abstract
regulative norms, in [35,1] proposals on the specification and implementation
of norms inside electronic institutions are described. Thus these approaches
face up with the implementation of constitutive norms from an institutional
perspective. In particular, they propose that the institution should translate
abstract regulative norms into specific ones making use of the ontology de-
fined by constitutive norms. These specific regulative norms are expressed
in terms of specific and precise facts that are controllable by the institution
infrastructure. Similarly, in [2] an implementation of constitutive norms to
relate abstract organizational specifications and norms to specific situations
that took place in the physical world was proposed.
A noteworthy work on constitutive norms is the proposal of Boella et al.
in [7]. In this work, they define a formal model of Normative MAS (NMAS)
in which the coordination and cooperation is achieved by means of consti-
tutive and regulative norms. In addition, they use the metaphor of NMAS
as agents, thus the NMAS have mental attitudes. In this sense, constitutive
norms are not modelled as operative constraints of an institution but as beliefs
of the normative agent, whereas regulative norms are the goals of the NMAS.
In this proposal, Boella et al. use constitutive norms for describing the legal
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consequences of actions in the normative system [8]. Thus, metanorms that de-
fine legal procedures for the definition of the normative system (i.e. the norm
change procedures) are also constitutive5. The work described in [6] details
how reasoning about constitutive norms can be done from an institutional
perspective. In particular, [6] proposes a mechanism for analysing and char-
acterizing the notions of redundancy and equivalence of normative systems
formed by both constitutive and regulative norms.
The problem of how agents reason about constitutive norms has only been
tackled from a logical and formal perspective. However, no one has yet pro-
vided means for software agents to take constitutive norms into account in
their practical reasoning; i.e., for inferring the consequences of their actions
on institutions and keeping track of the institutional state. As claimed by
Grossi et al. in [20], there is a need for proposals to allow software agents to
consider constitutive norms. Similarly, in [2] it is pointed out that constitutive
norms may be used by software agents to determine normative consequences
of actions and determine their future actions according to norms. Our thesis
is that constitutive norms are not just simple bricks for building institutional
ontologies used on the definition of regulative norms. As a consequence, agents
need not only to consider constitutive norms for translating abstract regulative
norms into specific ones, but also they must have an explicit and subjective
representation of constitutive norms. Thus, they would be able to reason about
the consequences that their behaviour should have on the institutional state.
3 Preliminaries
The purpose of this paper is not to propose, compare or improve existing
norm or agent definitions, but to make use of these definitions for proposing
an information model, knowledge representation and inference mechanism to
allow agents to reason about constitutive norms. The aim of this section is to
provide the reader with the basic notions of constitutive norm and normative
agent used in this paper.
3.1 Normative Definitions
We make use of a first-order predicate language L whose alphabet includes:
the logical connectives {∧,∨,¬}; parentheses, brackets, and other punctua-
tion symbols; an infinite set of variables and predicate, constant and function
symbols. For simplicity, variables are implicitly universally quantified6. In this
paper variables are written as any sequence of alphanumeric characters begin-
ning with a capital letter. Predicate, constant and function symbols will be
5 Notice that our proposal does not consider this dimension of constitutive norms as
metanorms.
6 Note that the appropriate use of Skolem functions [27] allows all existential quantifiers
to be removed without loss of expressivity.
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written as any sequence of alphanumeric characters beginning with a lower
case letter. Let us assume the standard definition for well-formed formulas
(wffs). We will make use of the standard notion of substitution of variables
in a wff ; i.e., σ is a finite and possibly empty set of pairs Y/y where Y is
a variable and y is a term [17]. The set of predicate symbols is formed by
action predicates (X), which describe the actions that can be performed by
agents; and state predicates (P), which describe properties of the physical and
institutional world. For example, the predicate raise(hand) is an action pred-
icate that represents the action of raising the hand. Similarly, the predicate
handRaised(agent) is an example of a state predicate that represents a prop-
erty of the physical world: i.e., it represents that the agent has raised its hand.
The institutional predicates (I) are subset of the state predicates (I ⊆ P) de-
scribing the state of the institutional state. Brute predicates (B) are the subset
of state predicates (B = P \ I) describing the state of the physical world. For
example, the predicate handRaised(agent) is a brute predicate that repre-
sents a state of the world in which the agent has raised its hand. Similarly,
bid(agent) is an example of an institutional predicate that represents a state
of the world in which the agent has bid for an object. Specifically, this bid in
the institutional world has been inferred from a state of the world in which the
agent has raised its hand. This relationship between the physical world and
the institutional world is defined in terms of constitutive norms as we explain
below.
3.1.1 Constitutive Norm
Constitutive norms define how actions or state of affairs taking place in the
physical world (i.e., brute facts) modify facts on the institutional state (i.e.,
institutional facts)7. Thus, they do not define restrictions on the behaviours,
but they introduce new classifications of facts, called institutional facts [32].
Institutional facts have been traditionally used for the definition of general
regulative norms [35,1,2]. For example cheating is an institutional fact that
can be defined by means of the following constitutive norm: looking at a book
in an exam or looking at others’ cards in a card game count-as cheating. The
notion of cheating can be used in order to express in a single regulative norm
that all forms of cheating are forbidden. Thus, constitutive norms can be used
for defining the ontology used by the institution in the expression of regulative
norms. Besides that, constitutive norms might allow agents to know their
capabilities for modifying the institutional state. Our proposal entails agents to
reason about this. Next, the formal definition of constitutive norm is provided.
Definition 1 (Constitutive Norm) A constitutive norm is a tuple 〈BF, IF,
C〉 where:
7 Constitutive norms can also define how institutional facts bring about higher-level insti-
tutional facts. In this paper, we will focus on constitutive norms that define the relationship
between brute facts and institutional facts. However, the information model, knowledge rep-
resentation and inference mechanism proposed in this paper can also be used for reasoning
about constitutive norms that define relationships between institutional facts.
Reasoning About Constitutive Norms in BDI Agents 7
– BF is an atomic formula built from the set B, such that it represents the
brute fact involved in the constitutive norm,
– IF is an atomic formula built from the set I, such that it represents the
institutional fact defined by the constitutive norm,
– C is wff of L that determines the context or type of situation in which the
constitutive norm is pertinent.
For example, in most countries like Spain, to drive exceeding the speed
limits inside the town boundaries count-as a driving offence. In Spain this limit
is defined as 50 Km/h. This fact is represented by the following constitutive
norm:
〈speed(V ehicle), drivingOffence(Vehicle), inTown(Town, V ehicle) ∧ speed(V ehicle) > 50〉
(Driving Offence Norm)
Once the context of a constitutive norm holds it becomes relevant and
must be considered by agents. In our proposal, agents use relevant constitutive
norms to extend their mental state. To ensure that the new formulas that are
inserted into the agents’ mental state are grounded, we define the notion of
well formed constitutive norm as follows:
Definition 2 (Well Formed Constitutive Norm) A constitutive norm
〈BF, IF,C〉 is a well formed norm iff vBF ⊆ (vC ∪vIF ) and vIF ⊆ (vC ∪vBF );
where vX is the set of variables occurring in any formula X.
Specifically, in our proposal agents use constitutive norms to infer beliefs about
the institutional state. For this reason, when an agent believes that a constitu-
tive norm 〈BF, IF,C〉 is relevant (i.e., when there is a substitution σ such that
σ(C) holds in the agent’s beliefs), then a belief about the physical world (i.e., a
belief about σ(BF )) must be used to infer a belief about the institutional world
(i.e. a belief about σ(IF )). For this reason, we define that vIF ⊆ (vC ∪ vBF ).
Moreover, we propose that agents use constitutive norms and abstract desires
(i.e., desires about the institutional world) to infer concrete desires (i.e., desires
about the physical world). For this reason, we define that vBF ⊆ (vC ∪ vIF ).
3.2 Normative Agent Definition
A normative agent in this paper is defined as a practical reasoning agent [9]
whose actions are directed towards its goals. Specifically, this paper focuses on
how an agent considers constitutive norms in its decisions; i.e., how an agent
considers the institutional repercussions of its acts. To make such kind of rea-
soning an agent considers its current circumstances (i.e., the beliefs about the
world in which it is placed); and its objectives or situations that the agent
would like to accomplish or bring about (i.e., its desires); and the norms that
are in force in its environment. Besides that, we want that our agents can per-
form practical reasoning in a dynamic and uncertain world. For these reasons,
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the Graded BDI architecture, which has been proposed and described in de-
tail in [11], is used in this paper. Specifically, this architecture has an explicit
representation of graded mental attitudes, such as graded beliefs and desires,
and fits perfectly the purpose of our paper.
Definition 3 (Normative BDI Agent) A Normative BDI agent is defined
as a tuple 〈B,D, I,N〉, where:
– B,D, I are the sets of graded beliefs, desires and intentions of the agent.
These sets are composed of M(γ, ρ) expressions, where: M ∈ {belief, des-
ire, intention} is a graded modality used for representing graded beliefs,
desires or intentions, respectively; γ is a grounded formula of L; and ρ ∈
[0, 1] represents the degree associated with this mental proposition. ρ rep-
resents a certainty degree in case of belief, a desirability degree in case of
desires8, and an intentionality degree in case of intentions9.
– N is a set formed by norm(n) expressions, where n is a constitutive norm.
Thus, the sets B,D, and I contain the cognitive elements, whereas the set N
contains the normative elements. We have decided to represent norms sepa-
rately from beliefs, desires and intentions due to two main reasons. Firstly,
we consider that representing norms independently of other mental attitudes
allows us to explain the norm reasoning process with more clarity: i.e., we are
able to define explicitly the relationships among norms and beliefs and desires.
Secondly, norms are different from beliefs. Norms have their own dynamics,
semantics and are considered in different steps of the agent reasoning.
Definition 3 describes the information model of the Normative BDI agent
used in this paper. Figure 1 explains how this model is used in the agent’s life-
cycle. This workflow is a simplification of the workflow we proposed in [13].
For the purpose of this paper it is only necessary to know that in Normative
BDI agents the information flows from perception to action according to three
main steps. Firstly, the agent perceives the environment and updates its beliefs
and norms10 (see Figure 1(a)). Secondly, in the deliberation step, the desire
set is revised (see Figure 1(b)). For example, new desires may be created from
the agent requirements. Similarly, desires that have been achieved must be
dropped. At this step the agent considers the set of norms that are relevant
and considers them to extend the cognitive elements (this reasoning process
is labelled as norm reasoning in Figure 1(b)). Finally, in the decision making
step, desires help the agent to select the most suitable plan to be intended
8 As defined in [11], the desirability of a proposition γ represents to what extent an agent
wants to achieve a situation in which γ holds.
9 According to [11], in our proposal intentions are not considered as a basic attitude.
Thus, the intentions of Normative BDI agents are generated on-line from the agents’ beliefs
and desires. The intentionality degree of a proposition γ is the consequence of finding a best
feasible plan that permits a state of the world where γ holds to be achieved.
10 Norm acquisition rules are part of the perception step since they are responsible for
organizing, identifying and interpreting perceptions to represent and understand the norms
that regulate the agent environment.
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(see Figure 1(c)). Algorithm 1 illustrates the pseudo-code of the workflow
performed by Normative BDI agents, showing how the components of the
information model are updated.
Belief Update
 Rules
Environment
Norm Acquisition
Rules
B N
(a) Perception
Norm Reasoning
Rules
Desire Update
Rules
D
I B N
(b) Deliberation
Intention Generation
Rules
Environment
Action Selection
Rules
B
I
D Plan
Library
(c) Decision Making
Fig. 1 Reasoning Phases in a Normative BDI Agent. The sets that contain the cognitive
and normative elements (i.e., the sets B,D, I,N) are represented as circles. The reasoning
processes are represented as boxes where: the input links represent the information used
by the reasoning process, and the output links represent the information updated by the
reasoning process.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of algorithm executed by Normative BDI agents
function Reasoning(B,D, I))
while true do
p← perceiveEnvironmentRules() . Perception Phase
B ← BeliefUpdateRules(B, p)
N ← NormAcquisitionRules(N, p)
D ← DesireUpdateRules(D,B, I) . Deliberation Phase
B,D ← NormReasoningRules(B,D,N)
I ← IntentionGenerationRules(B,D, I, P lanLibrary) . Decision Making Phase
a← ActionSelectionRules(I)
execute(a)
end while
end function
In this paper we only focus on how a Normative BDI agent takes constitu-
tive norms into account. Other problems such as the generation of intentions
from graded mental propositions [11], or the acquisition of norms [3] have been
addressed in other proposals.
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4 Reasoning About Constitutive Norms: Norm Reasoning Rules
In our proposal, constitutive norms are used to extend the agent beliefs and
desires11. Specifically, this extension is carried out by a set of norm reason-
ing rules. Figure 2 illustrates the norm reasoning process that we propose.
Thereby, agents are able to determine the effect that their actions would have
on the institutional state. Algorithm 2 illustrates the pseudo-code of the norm
reasoning rules executed by Normative BDI agents.
DB
N
Belief Generation Rules
Desire Generation Rules
 N
o
rm
 
R
e
a
s
o
n
in
g
R
u
le
s
Fig. 2 Reasoning About Constitutive Norms in Normative BDI agents. The sets that con-
tain the cognitive and normative elements (i.e., the sets B,D,N) are represented as circles.
The reasoning processes are represented as boxes where: the input links represent the in-
formation used by the reasoning process, and the output links represent the information
updated by the reasoning process.
Algorithm 2 Pseudocode of NormReasoning algorithm
function NormReasoningRules(B,D,N)
B ← BeliefGenerationRules(B,N)
D ← DesireGenerationRules(D,N)
return (B,D)
end function
Next, the specific norm reasoning rules for creating beliefs and desires
from constitutive norms are provided. These rules are operational rules [28]
that define a transition relation between configurations of Normative BDI
agents. In our proposal a configuration of a Normative BDI agent is a tuple
Conf = 〈B,D, I,N〉, where: B,D, I are the sets of graded beliefs, desires,
and intentions; and N is the set of norms (see Definition 3). Thus, our norm
reasoning rules define transitions between configurations as follows:
preCond
Conf → Conf ′
11 Beliefs and desires generated from constitutive norms are added to the belief and desire
sets of agents. These two sets are later used by agents to generate and drop intentions
on-line. Thus, there is not a direct link between constitutive norms and intentions. As a
consequence, intentions are not considered in our proposal.
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where the top of the rule — represented by the expression preCond — is
a boolean expression that represents the precondition of the rule, and the
bottom of the rule — represented by the expression Conf → Conf ′— defines
the transitions between configurations: i.e., how the initial configuration —
represented by the expression Conf— changes once the rule is applied —
represented by the expression Conf ′.
4.1 Belief Generation Operational Rules
As aforementioned, constitutive norms are used by agents for inferring beliefs
about the institutional world. Next, we describe the specific rules that are used
by agents to infer beliefs from constitutive norms.
Believing institutional facts being true. Informally, a constitutive norm is a
rule that determines in which circumstances a brute fact counts-as institu-
tional fact. Thus, when an agent believes that a constitutive norm is relevant
to its current situation and the brute fact involved in the norm is true, then it
should believe that the institutional fact is also true. We propose that agents
must also have an explicit and subjective knowledge (i.e., beliefs) about insti-
tutional facts. To this aim, we propose in this paper the following rule that
models this reasoning process as follows:
∃norm(〈BF, IF,C〉) ∈ N ∧ ∃σ : (belief(σ(C), ρσ(C)) ∈ B ∧ belief(σ(BF ), ρσ(BF )) ∈ B)
〈B,D, I,N〉 → 〈B′, D, I,N〉
where B′ = fRealism(B, belief(σ(IF ), fExpansion(ρσ(BF ), ρσ(C))))
(Believing institutional facts being true)
This rule can be applied when (i) there is a constitutive norm — i.e., exists a
norm norm(〈BF, IF,C〉) in N — ; (ii) the agent believes that this constitutive
norm is relevant — i.e., there is a substitution σ such that the expression
(belief(σ(C), ρσ(C)) is in B; where σ(C) denotes the result of applying σ to
C, and ρσ(C) is a real number within the [0, 1] representing the certainty about
the context of the constitutive norm (i.e., the relevance or pertinence of the
norm to the current situation) —; and (iii) the basic fact involved in the
constitutive norm holds — i.e., the expression belief(σ(BF ), ρσ(BF )) is in B;
where ρσ(BF ) is a real number within the [0, 1] that represents the certainty
about the brute fact. When the three preconditions are true, then a new belief
will be inferred corresponding to the new institutional fact — i.e., a belief as
belief(σ(IF ), fExpansion(ρσ(BF ), ρσ(C))) is inferred.
The certainty degree assigned to the new belief represents the certainty
about the institutional fact. It is defined by the fExpansion function, which
combines the relevance of the norm — i.e., the value of ρσ(C)— and the cer-
tainty in which the brute fact holds — i.e., the value of ρσ(BF )— as a real
value within the [0, 1] interval. Both conditions, the relevance of the norm and
the brute fact, are required for creating a new belief. For example, if a norm
is not relevant and it has no longer effect (i.e., ρσ(C) is 0), then the certainty
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of any institutional fact inferred from this norm must be 0 regardless of the
certainty of the brute fact. Moreover, the higher the relevance or the certainty
of the brute facts is, the higher the certainty of the institutional fact must
be. Therefore, fExpansion is defined as a numerical fusion operator
12 that can
be given different definitions depending on the properties that are required in
each concrete application. In this article, we consider that the conditions that
are necessary to create a belief about an institutional fact (i.e., the existence of
a relevant constitutive norm and the existence of a belief about the brute fact
involved in this constitutive norm) are independent (e.g., the consideration of
a constitutive norm as relevant does not imply that the agent believes that
the brute fact involved in the norm holds). As a consequence, the combina-
tion among the uncertain values that cause the creation of a belief about an
institutional fact is defined as follows:
fExpansion(ρσ(BF ), ρσ(C)) = ρσ(BF ) ∗ ρσ(C)
fRealism is a function that takes as input a set of beliefs and a new belief
inferred from a constitutive norm and combines them. The way in which the
belief set and the new belief are combined determines the agent personality.
In the next section, we describe some of the main agent types according to the
definition given to this function.
Believing institutional facts being false. When an agent believes that a con-
stitutive norm is relevant to its current situation and the brute fact involved
in the norm is false, then it should believe that the institutional fact is also
false13. To model this reasoning process, we propose in this paper the following
rule:
∃norm(〈BF, IF,C〉) ∈ N ∧ ∃σ : (belief(σ(C), ρσ(C)) ∈ B ∧ belief(¬σ(BF ), ρσ(BF )) ∈ B)
〈B,D, I,N〉 → 〈B′, D, I,N〉
where B′ = fRealism(B, belief(¬σ(IF ), fExpansion(ρσ(BF ), ρσ(C))))
(Believing institutional facts being false)
If an agent believes that a constitutive norm is relevant — i.e., belief(σ(C),
ρσ(C)) is in B— and the basic fact involved in the constitutive norm does
not hold — i.e., belief(¬σ(BF ), ρσ(BF )) belongs to B—, then a new belief
will be inferred corresponding to the negation of the institutional fact — i.e.,
belief(¬σ(IF ), fExpansion(ρσ(BF ), ρσ(C))) is generated.
4.2 Desire Generation Operational Rules
Constitutive norms are also used for inferring desires. Specifically, constitutive
norms are used to infer desires to bring about states of affairs in which brute
12 For a review and classification of data fusion operators see [5].
13 Note that our agents do not use a close world assumption where everything unknown is
false. In contrast, our agents assume that everything unknown is uncertain.
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facts hold or not. Agents’ motivations are the basis for determining which
actions will be carried out. Since agents have no capabilities for altering the
institutional state directly, then constitutive norms define how abstract desires
(which are related to institutional facts) can be redefined in terms of brute
facts that can be modified by agents.
Desiring to bring about brute facts. When an agent believes that a constitutive
norm is relevant to its current situation and it desires to achieve a state of
affairs in which the institutional fact defined by the norm holds, then the agent
should also desire to achieve a state of affairs in which the related brute fact
holds. To model this reasoning process, we propose in this paper the following
rule:
∃norm(〈BF, IF,C〉) ∈ N ∧ ∃σ : (belief(σ(C), ρσ(C)) ∈ B ∧ desire(σ(IF ), ρσ(IF )) ∈ D)
〈B,D, I,N〉 → 〈B,D′, I, N〉
where D′ = fOrientation(D, desire(σ(BF ), fExpansion(ρσ(IF ), ρσ(C))))
(Desiring to bring about brute facts)
This rule can be applied when (i) there is a constitutive norm — i.e., if
exists a norm norm(〈BF, IF,C〉) in N — ; (ii) the agent believes that this
constitutive norm is relevant — i.e., if there is a substitution σ such that the
expression (belief(σ(C), ρσ(C)) is in B — ; and the agent desires to bring
about a state of affairs in which the institutional fact defined by the norm
holds — i.e., desire(σ(IF ), ρσ(IF )) is in D. When the three preconditions are
true, then a new desire will be inferred corresponding to the brute fact — i.e.,
desire(σ(BF ), fExpansion(ρσ(IF ), ρσ(C))) is inferred.
As before, the desirability degree assigned to the new desire is defined by
the fExpansion functions:
fExpansion(ρσ(IF ), ρσ(C)) = ρσ(IF ) ∗ ρσ(C)
fOrientation is a function that takes as input a set of desires and a new desire
inferred from a constitutive norm and combines them. In the next section, we
describe some of the main agent types according to the definition given to this
function.
Desiring not to bring about brute facts. When an agent believes that a con-
stitutive norm is relevant to its current situation and it desires to achieve a
state of affairs in which the institutional fact defined by the norm does not
hold, then the agent should also desire to achieve a state of affairs in which
the brute fact does not hold. To model this reasoning process, we propose in
this paper the following rule:
∃norm(〈BF, IF,C〉) ∈ N ∧ ∃σ : (belief(σ(C), ρσ(C)) ∈ B ∧ desire(¬σ(IF ), ρσ(IF )) ∈ D)
〈B,D, I,N〉 → 〈B,D′, I, N〉
where D′ = fOrientation(D, desire(¬σ(BF ), fExpansion(ρσ(IF ), ρσ(C))))
(Desiring not to bring about brute facts)
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The main difference between the implementation of constitutive and reg-
ulative norms is that regulative norms are motivational [12] (i.e., they create
new desires to comply with them) whereas constitutive norms are a special
kind of inference rules for extending the belief and desire theories. However,
constitutive norms do not affect directly the agents’ behaviour. Constitutive
norms do not create desires to bring about states of affairs different from the
ones already desired. Actually, constitutive norms create new desires about
the physical world that allow existing desires about the institutional world
to be achieved. For this reason, our agents have no motivations for rejecting
the desires inferred from constitutive norms. As a consequence, the rules de-
scribed in this section do not include any condition that checks whether the
agent accepts the formulas that are inferred from constitutive norms.
5 Agent Types with Respect to Constitutive Norms
Classically, agent types are characterized by stating conflict resolution types
in terms of orders between mental attitudes [10]. For example, an agent is
social when obligations are stronger than the other motivational components
[19], etc.
According to the norm reasoning rules defined in Section 4, constitutive
norms are taken into account by agents to extend their belief and desire set.
It is possible that the formulas generated by the norm reasoning rules are
inconsistent14 with the existing beliefs or desires of the agent. For example, an
agent may observe some evidence that sustains a belief about an institutional
fact while being able to infer a belief about the same institutional fact with a
different degree.
In this paper, we propose that the fRealism function (vs. the fOrientation
function) defines a prevalence order among the existing set of beliefs (vs. de-
sires) and the new belief (vs. desire) inferred from a constitutive norm. Specif-
ically, the fRealism function (vs. the fOrientation function) determines which
must be the degree of a belief about an institutional fact (vs. a desire about a
brute fact)15. Therefore, we can define different agent types according to the
priority that they give to the formulas inferred from norms and the existing
beliefs and desires.
14 In this paper, we define that two formulas M(γ, ρ) and M ′(γ′, ρ′) are inconsistent when
M = M ′, γ = γ′, and ρ 6= ρ′; i.e., when the two graded formulas agree on their logical
content but not in the degrees.
15 Notice that this question is different from the problem of maintaining consistency (e.g.,
taking control about replicated or inconsistent formulas) in the mental sets (B,D, I). This
problem is out of the scope of this paper and has been addressed by other proposals. For
example, in [25] Joseph proposes a coherence-based mechanism for solving inconsistencies
in graded BDI agents.
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5.1 Realism Function: Priority Among Beliefs
According to the priority relationship that can be defined between the existing
beliefs16 and the beliefs that can be inferred from constitutive norms at some
point, we classify agents into:
– Observation-Realistic agents are those ones that in case of inconsistency
between a belief that is inferred from a constitutive norm and an existing
belief determine that the existing belief prevails. This means that if an
observation-realistic agent is able to observe an institutional fact (e.g.,
it is informed by a third party that its civil status is married), then this
belief is more plausible than the inferences that it can make, at this specific
moment, according to the constitutive norms that it knows. More formally,
in an observation-realistic agent the fRealism function is defined as follows:
fRealism(B, belief(BF, ρ)) =
{
B ∪ {belief(BF, ρ)} if 6 ∃ρ′ : belief(BF, ρ′) ∈ B
B if ∃ρ′ : belief(BF, ρ′) ∈ B
– Norm-Realistic agents are those ones that in case of inconsistency between
a belief that is inferred from a constitutive norm and an existing belief de-
termine that the belief inferred from the constitutive norm prevails. This
means that if a norm-realistic agent is able to infer an institutional fact
(e.g., it knows it has formalised a marriage contract and it is able to infer
that it is married), then this conclusion is more plausible than the infor-
mation that it already believes. More formally, in a norm-realistic agent
the fRealism function is defined as follows:
fRealism(B, belief(BF, ρ)) =
{
B ∪ {belief(BF, ρ)} if 6 ∃ρ′ : belief(BF, ρ′) ∈ B
B \ {belief(BF, ρ′)} ∪ {belief(BF, ρ)} if ∃ρ′ : belief(BF, ρ′) ∈ B
5.2 Orientation Function: Priority Among Desires
According to the priority relationship that can be defined between the existing
desires17 and the desires that can be inferred from constitutive norms at some
point, we classify agents into:
– Desire-Oriented agents are those ones that in case of inconsistency between
a desire that is inferred from a constitutive norm and an existing desire
determine that the existing desire prevails. This means that if a desire-
oriented agent determines that it desires to achieve a state of affairs in
which a brute fact holds (e.g., it does not want to exceed 50 Km/h to
minimize petrol consumption), then this consequence is more important
16 Note that the existing beliefs might contain also beliefs that have been inferred from
constitutive norms at some point in the past.
17 Note that the existing desires might contain also desires that have been inferred from
constitutive norms at some point in the past.
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than the inferences he can make, at this specific moment, according to the
constitutive norms that it knows. More formally, in a desire-oriented agent
the fOrientation function is defined as follows:
fOrientation(D, desire(IF, ρ)) =
{
D ∪ {desire(IF, ρ)} if 6 ∃ρ′ : desire(IF, ρ′) ∈ D
D if ∃ρ′ : desire(IF, ρ′) ∈ D
– Norm-Oriented agents are those ones that in case of inconsistency between
a desire that is inferred from a constitutive norm and an existing desire,
the desire inferred from the constitutive norm prevails. This means that if a
norm-oriented agent is able to derive an desire to achieve a brute fact (e.g.,
it desires to avoid driving offences and it desires not to exceed 50 Km/h
since this counts-as a driving offence inside a town), then this conclusion
is more important than the desires that it already has. More formally, in
a norm-oriented agent the fOrientation function is defined as follows:
fOrientation(D, desire(IF, ρ)) =
{
D ∪ {desire(IF, ρ)} if 6 ∃ρ′ : desire(IF, ρ′) ∈ D
D \ {desire(IF, ρ′)} ∪ {desire(IF, ρ)} if ∃ρ′ : desire(IF, ρ′) ∈ D
In this section we have provided an agent typology and a descriptive char-
acterization of each agent type. Section 7 describes a set of experiments that
have been carried out to evaluate the performance of our proposal for reason-
ing about constitutive norms and providing an experimental characterization
of the different agent types. The next section illustrates how a Normative BDI
agent reasons about constitutive norms with our proposal.
6 Illustrative Example
This example shows how an agent employs our proposal for reasoning about
constitutive norms. Specifically, this example shows how an agent uses con-
stitutive norms for extending its mental theory and how constitutive norms
affect the decision making process.
6.1 Initial Situation
Let us suppose that there are two agents a and b which are “a couple”. In this
example, we will focus our attention in agent a, which is a Normative BDI
agent that makes use of our proposal for reasoning about constitutive norms.
Agent a considers that a couple are two agents that are in love and that live
together. According to these conditions, agents a and b are a couple. Thus,
a has a belief corresponding to being a couple with b with a certainty degree
equal to 1 — i.e., belief(couple(a, b), 1) belongs to B. Regarding motivations
of agent a, let us suppose that it wants to be married with agent b with the
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highest intensity — i.e., desire(married(a, b), 1) belongs to D. Moreover, it
also wants to gain a mortgage with agent b with the highest intensity — i.e.,
desire(mortgage(a, b), 1) belongs to D. Figure 3 shows how the different for-
mulas are generated in the normative and cognitive elements of the Normative
BDI agent18. Next, the different reasoning phases of this agent are described.
Agent a
B
belief(couple(a,b),1)
D N
desire(married(a,b), 1)
desire(mortgage(a,b), 1)Initial Situation
<formalised(marriage,X,Y),
married(X,Y), couple(X,Y) >
<formalised(deed,X,Y),
mortgage(X,Y),married(X,Y) >Norm Acquisition
desire(formalised(marriage,
a,b),1)Norm Reasoning
Decision Making
belief(formalised(marriage,a,b),
1)Belief Update
belief(married(a,b),1)
Norm Reasoning
desire(formalised(deed,
a,b),1)
Fig. 3 Belief, Desire and Normative sets of agent a. These sets are represented as rectan-
gles. The horizontal dashed lines determine the formulas that are inserted in the different
reasoning phases.
6.2 Reasoning Process
Agent a executes Algorithm 1. Thus, it starts the reasoning cycle by perceiving
the environment and updating the beliefs and norms. In the following we
illustrate how formulas are generated by each reasoning process19.
Perception Phase: Norm Acquisition Rules. Marriage is an institutional fact
that is defined by a constitutive norm that claims that if any pair of agents
X, Y , which are a couple20 — represented by the expression couple(X,Y )—,
formalise a marriage contract — represented by the expression formalised
(marriage,X, Y ), then it counts-as as they are married — represented by the
18 The generation of intentions from desires is not relevant to this case study and, as a
consequence, the intentions have not been included in Figure 3.
19 For simplicity we do not include the explanation of the reasoning processes when they
do not alter the mental state of agent a; i.e., when the set of formulas remains unchanged.
20 Here, we assume that marriages of convenience or arranged marriages between strangers
are not accepted. Therefore, agents that do not maintain a relationship (i.e., are not a couple)
cannot be married even if they formalize a marriage contract.
18 N. Criado et al.
expression married(X,Y ). This norm is formally defined as follows:
〈formalised(marriage,X, Y ),married(X,Y ), couple(X,Y )〉
Similarly, gaining a mortgage is an institutional fact that is defined by a con-
stitutive norm that claims that if any pair of agents X, Y , which are married21
— represented by the expression married(X,Y )—, formalise a deed contract
— represented by the expression formalised(deed,X, Y )—, then it counts-as
as they gain a mortgage — represented by the expression mortgage(X,Y ).
This norm is formally defined as follows:
〈formalised(deed,X, Y ),mortgage(X,Y ),married(X,Y )〉
Let us assume that agent a acquires these constitutive norms by consulting
a public norm repository (e.g., the OMS in the THOMAS framework [16]) or
artifact (e.g., the NormativeBoard in the ORA4MAS framework [23]). Thus,
agent a updates its normative set accordingly.
Deliberation Phase: Norm Reasoning Rules. The marriage norm is used by
the agent to determine how the desire of being married can be translated in
terms of properties of the environment that can be modified by the agent.
Specifically, the “Desiring to bring about brute facts” rule is executed and a
new desire to formalise a marriage contract is created as follows:
∃norm(〈BF, IF,C〉) ∈ N ∧ ∃σ : desire(σ(IF ), ρσ(IF )) ∈ D ∧ belief(σ(C), ρσ(C)) ∈ B
〈B,D, I,N〉 → 〈B,D′, I, N〉
where BF = formalised(marriage,X, Y ); IF = married(X,Y ); C = couple(X,Y );
σ = {X/a, Y/b}; ρmarried(a,b) = 1; ρcouple(a,b) = 1;
D′ = fOrientation(D, desire(formalised(marriage, a, b), fExpansion(1, 1))
Considering the proposed definition of fExpansion (see Equation 4.2):
fExpansion(1, 1) = 1× 1 = 1
Since the agent has not any desire about the expression formalised(marriage, a, b),
then the new desire inferred from the constitutive norm is inserted into the
desire set22. Thus, a new desire is generated inside the desire set — i.e., a
desire such as desire(formalised(marriage, a, b), 1) is inserted into D. This
implies that the agent has been able to create a more specific desire about for-
malising a contract that will allow it to achieve a more abstract desire about
being married.
21 Here, we assume agents need to be married to gain a mortgage. Of course, in real-life,
people are not required to be married for signing mortgages.
22 Note that there is not an inconsistency between the existing desires and the desire
inferred from the constitutive norm and, in this case, both norm-oriented and desire-oriented
agents behave equally.
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Decision Making Phase. Now rules for making a decision about the next ac-
tion to be performed are considered. Mainly, this process consists of generating
plans for reaching the desired state given that the agent knows the existence
of actions that could achieve it. For example, agent a knows that a contract
among two agents is formalised when both agents sign this contract and the
contract is registered. Thus, the agent generates an intention to execute a plan
for signing and registering the contract. Then, this plan is executed.
Perception Phase: Belief Update Rules. As a consequence of the execution
of the plan, agent a formalises a marriage contract and updates its beliefs
accordingly — i.e., belief(formalised(marriage, a, b), 1) is inserted into B.
Deliberation Phase: Norm Reasoning Rules. Since the agent believes that the
marriage constitutive norm is relevant (i.e., agent a beliefs that agent a and b
are a couple) and it believes that a marriage contract has been formalised, then
the “Believing institutional facts being true” rule is applied. As a consequence,
a new belief that represents that the agents a and b are married is created as
follows:
∃norm(〈BF, IF,C〉) ∈ N ∧ ∃σ : belief(σ(BF ), ρσ(BF )) ∈ B ∧ belief(σ(C), ρσ(C)) ∈ B
〈B,D, I,N〉 → 〈B′, D, I,N〉
where BF = formalised(marriage,X, Y ); IF = married(X,Y ); C = couple(X,Y );
σ = {X/a, Y/b}; ρformalised(marriage,a,b) = 1; ρcouple(a,b) = 1;
B′ = fRealism(B, belief(married(a, b), fExpansion(1, 1)))
Again, fExpansion(1, 1) = 1 and the belief set is updated — i.e., belief(married(a, b,
), 1) is inserted into B. Thanks to this belief, the abstract desire of being mar-
ried can be retracted, since it has been achieved. This process is carried out by
the desire update rules on Algorithm 1 that are responsible for creating new
desires and dropping those ones that have been achieved.
Moreover, the new belief about the marriage institutional fact allows agent
a to determine how the desire of gaining a mortgage can be translated in
terms of states of affairs that can be achieved by it. Specifically, the mortgage
constitutive norm is a second order norm: i.e., a constitutive norm whose
context is expressed in terms of institutional facts. In this case the“Desiring
to bring about brute facts” rule is executed and a new desire to formalise a
deed contract is created as follows:
∃norm(〈BF, IF,C〉) ∈ N ∧ ∃σ : desire(σ(IF ), ρσ(IF )) ∈ D ∧ belief(σ(C), ρσ(C)) ∈ B
〈B,D, I,N〉 → 〈B,D′, I, N〉
where BF = formalised(deed,X, Y ); IF = mortgage(X,Y ); C = married(X,Y );
σ = {X/a, Y/b}; ρmortgage(a,b) = 1; ρmarried(a,b) = 1;
D′ = fOrientation(D, desire(formalised(deed, a, b), fExpansion(1, 1))
As a result, a new desire is generated inside the desire set — i.e., a desire
such as desire(formalised(deed, a, b), 1) is inserted into D. This implies that
the agent has been able to create a more specific desire about formalising
a deed that will allow it to achieve a more abstract desire about gaining a
mortgage.
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The marriage example is a metaphor for how agents are able to perform
those actions (e.g., following the specific protocols and sequences of actions)
that entail the modification of the institutional state (e.g., the performance of
trading operations).
7 Experimental Results
This section evaluates the performance of our proposal when agents reason
about constitutive norms. We have carried out several experiments to evaluate
if our approach allows agents to keep track of the institutional state precisely23.
Specifically, we demonstrate that: (i) our proposal allows agents to keep track
of the institutional state with more precision than agents that simply observe
the institutional state; (ii) even if agents are able to perceive the institutional
facts, it is better to complement this information with the information that
is derived from reasoning about constitutive norms; and (iii) agents that use
their perceptions to reason about constitutive norms and making inferences
about the institutional state are not more sensitive to the precision of these
perceptions than agents that simply observe the institutional state. Moreover,
these experiments allow us to provide a characterization of the different agent
types.
7.1 Experiment Description
We have considered a scenario in which there is a set of agents that belong
to the same institution (e.g., an e-market). In this institution a set of con-
stitutive norms has been registered in a repository. All agents have access to
the norm repository. Constitutive norms regulate the creation of institutional
facts (e.g., constitutive norms may define the specific actions that count-as
trading operations). Agents may perform different actions during their execu-
tion causing changes in the environment (e.g., sold items may be delivered)
and in the institutional state (e.g., a purchase contract is executed). Agents
are able to observe their environment. Moreover, agents are able to observe
a part of the institutional state (e.g., there may be a facilitator agent in the
e-market that informs about the execution of the purchase contracts signed
by a specific agent). The rest of institutional facts are not visible by agents
and their truth-value can only be determined by means of constitutive norms
(e.g., an agent that observes that the actions that count-as executing a pur-
chase contract have been performed by another agent can determine that the
purchase contract has been executed).
23 For simplicity, we will only focus on detecting the institutional changes; i.e., this exper-
iment only takes into account how agents extend their belief base. As a consequence, the
results described in this section only take into account the generation of beliefs from consti-
tutive norms. However, similar results were obtained when we also considered the generation
of desires.
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Parameter Value
# of agents 3
# of constitutive norms 10
# of steps 400
# of repetitions 1000
# of institutional facts 10
Visibility of institutional facts 0.25
# of atomic formulas 20
Agent accuracy [0, 1]
Opacity Coefficient 0.5
Table 1 Parameters used in the norm recognition experiment
We have built a simulator of this scenario with the parameters that we
sum up in Table 1. Algorithm 3 contains the pseudo code of this simulator.
According to this algorithm, in our simulator there is a set of agents that be-
long to an institution in which there are 10 constitutive norms24. Agents have
access to a repository that contains the information about these constitutive
norms (this corresponds to the instruction named Norm Acquisition on Algo-
rithm 3). Once the agents have read the repository of constitutive norms, they
observe the environment to keep track of the institutional state. Specifically,
in each step of the experiment they observe the changes in the environment
and in the institutional state. With this information they update their beliefs
and the norms. Then, they carry out the deliberation phase and the decision
making phase. The experiment is executed during 400 steps. Moreover, each
experiment has been repeated 1000 times to support the findings.
Each agent acts as a binomial classifier that determines which of the insti-
tutional facts hold and which ones not. In each step, we inspect the belief set
of agents and compare the estimation made by agents against the institutional
state. Specifically, in each iteration we update: the number of true positives
(TP ), which is the number of times that an agent considers that an institu-
tional fact is true and it is actually true; the number of true negatives (TN),
which is the number of times that an agent considers that an institutional fact
is not true and it is actually false; the number of false positives (FP ), which
is the number of times that an agent considers that an institutional fact is
true and it is not true; and the number of false negatives (FN), which is the
number of times that an agent considers that an institutional fact is false and
it is actually true.
Matthews Correlation Coefficient. The Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC)
[4] is used as a measure of the quality of binary classifications. It takes into
account true and false positives and negatives and is generally regarded as a
balanced measure which can be used even if the classes are of very different
24 Note that we assume that the set of constitutive norms is not changed during an exper-
iment.
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Algorithm 3 Pseudocode of algorithm executed by our simulator
function Simulator
N ← randomNormCreation() . Norm Definition
IF,BF ← randomEnvironmentCreation() . Environment Definition
A ← createAgents() . Agent Creation
for a ∈ A do
a.N ← NormAcquisitionRules(N) . Norm Acquisition
end for
while the simulator has not been executed all the steps do
Actions← ∅
V IF ← V isibleInstitutionalFacts(IF, visibility). Visibility of Institutional Facts
for a ∈ A do
p← PerceiveEnvironmentRules(V IF,BF, a.accuracy, opacity) . Perception
a.B ← BeliefUpdateRules(a.B, p)
a.D ← DesireUpdateRules(a.D, a.B, a.I) . Deliberation
if a is a normative agent then
a.B, a.D ← NormReasoningRules(a.B, a.D, a.N)
end if
R← UpdateResults(R, a.B, IF ) . Inspection
I ← IntentionGenerationRules(a.B, a.D, a.I, P lanLibrary) . Decision
Making
Actions← Actions ∪ActionSelectionRules(a.I)
end for
IF,BF ← evolveEnvironement(IF,BF,N,Actions) . Environment Evolution
end while
return CalculateMCC(R)
end function
sizes. The MCC can be calculated using the formula:
MCC =
TP × TN − FP × FN√
(TP + FP )(TP + FN)(TN + FP )(TN + FN)
The MCC is in essence a correlation coefficient between the observed and pre-
dicted binary classifications; it returns a value between -1 and +1. A coefficient
of +1 represents a perfect prediction, 0 an average random prediction and -1
an inverse prediction. While there is no perfect way of describing the confu-
sion matrix of true and false positives and negatives by a single number, the
Matthews correlation coefficient is generally regarded as being one of the best
measures.
7.1.1 Norm Definition
In each experiment, 10 constitutive norms are randomly created (this cor-
responds to the instruction named Norm Definition on Algorithm 3). These
norms regulate the creation of 10 institutional facts. As previously mentioned,
the institutional state is not fully visible and the truth-value of some of the
institutional facts cannot be observed. To simulate this, we consider that the
truth-value of any institutional fact is observable with a probability of 0.25
(this corresponds to the instruction named Visibility of Institutional Facts on
Algorithm 3). When it is not observable, agents have to use constitutive norms
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to infer the truth-value. Specifically, agents have to observe their environment
to determine whether the brute fact (BF ) and the context (C) of a constitu-
tive norm hold or not. We assume that for each constitutive norm 〈BF, IF,C〉
the elements BF and C are defined as an atomic formula that represents a
state of affairs. Specifically, we consider a set of 20 different atomic formulas.
Thus, for each constitutive norm the brute fact and the context of each are
randomly assigned to a proposition of this set.
7.1.2 Environment Definition
As previously mentioned, in this experiment we assume that the physical en-
vironment is described in terms of 20 different atomic formulas. Each one of
these formulas represents a state of affairs (i.e., a brute fact) of the physical
environment. At the beginning of each experiment, these states of affairs are
randomly defined as holding or not; i.e., the truth-value of the 20 atomic for-
mulas is randomly defined as true or false (this corresponds to the instruction
named Environment Definition on Algorithm 3). We also assume that the in-
stitutional environment is described by 10 institutional facts. At the beginning
of each experiment, the institutional facts are defined as holding or not. In this
case, the initial truth-value of the institutional facts is defined considering the
constitutive norms. Therefore, only those institutional facts that can be in-
ferred from the initial state of the environment and the constitutive norms are
true. The rest of institutional facts are initially false.
As the agents execute actions during the experiment, both the physical
and the institutional environment evolve (this corresponds to the instruction
named Environment Evolution on Algorithm 3). Therefore, the truth-values
of the 20 atomic formulas that represent the physical environment change
according to the actions performed by agents. Similarly, the truth-value of the
10 institutional facts change as a consequence of the changes in the physical
environment25.
In our simulator we define the opacity of the environment as a feature
that determines the difficulty to observe the environment. Specifically, the
opacity coefficient is a real value that determines the magnitude or the error
made by all agents when they observe the environment. The more opaque the
environment is, the more difficult is for agents to observe it. Thus, the error
made by agents when they observe the environment would increases as the
opacity increases. In the experiments we fixed the opacity coefficient to 0.5.
7.1.3 Agent Implementation
As previously mentioned, at the beginning of each experiment agents read
the norm repository and, as a consequence, all of them know the same 10
25 Recall that, the truth-values of institutional facts are always consistent with the state
of the environment and the constitutive norms.
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constitutive norms defined in each experiment26. The initial belief and desire
bases of each agent are randomly defined at the beginning of the experiment
(this corresponds to the instruction named Agent Creation on Algorithm 3).
Specifically, agents initialise the certainty of the brute and institutional facts
as random real values within the [0, 1] interval. Recall that these initial beliefs
will be updated during the agent execution by the perception and deliberation
phases (see Algorithm 3). Agents also pursue a set of goals that represent de-
sired (vs. undesired) situations that the agent wants to achieve (vs. avoid). For
simplicity, we assume that agents pursue different desires that are randomly
generated during the experiment27.
According to Algorithm 3, in each step of the experiment agents execute
three different phases (see Figure 1).
1. Perception. Agents are able to observe their environment. Specifically, they
are able to observe the truth-value of the atomic formulas that describe
the physical and the institutional state. However, the agents have limited
capabilities for observing their environment. The accuracy of each agent
to observe its environment is randomly assigned to a real value within the
[0, 1] interval. The highest the accuracy, the more exact the observations
are. Hence, the observations of agents are affected by a random normally-
distributed noise28. We consider a normally-distributed noise with mean
0.0 and a varying standard deviation depending on the agent accuracy
and the difficulty to observe the environment (i.e., the opacity coefficient).
Specifically, we consider the distribution:
N ∼ (0, (1− accuracy) ∗ opacity)
where the value of opacity coefficient is shared by all agents.
Thus, in each step agents observe their environment and apply belief up-
date rules for translating their observations into beliefs. In this experiment
we have defined the following belief update rules:
observation(α, ρ)∧ 6 ∃ρ′ : belief(α, ρ′) ∈ B
〈B,D, I,N〉 → 〈B′, D, I,N〉
whereB′ = B ∪ {belief(α, ρ)}
observation(α, ρ) ∧ ∃ρ′ : belief(α, ρ′) ∈ B
〈B,D, I,N〉 → 〈B′, D, I,N〉
whereB′ = B \ {belief(α, ρ′)} ∪ {belief(α, ρ)}
where α is an atomic formula representing a state of the environment or
the institution, and ρ is the certainty of this observation.
26 Note that our goal is to evaluate the rules that we propose for reasoning about consti-
tutive norms. Thus, we want that the only difference among the agents is the way in which
they consider constitutive norms, not the specific norms that they know.
27 Note that we assume that agents always have at least one desire that can be pursued.
28 Notice that we denote the falsity value as 0 and the true value as 1.
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2. Deliberation. Agents revise their desires in the deliberation phase. Specifi-
cally, in this phase agents remove their desires from the desire set as soon
as they achieve them.
Moreover, in the deliberation phase agents apply the norm reasoning rules
for keeping track of the institutional state. In this experiment, we create
agents that have different capabilities for reasoning about norms:
Non-Normative. These agents are BDI agents that do not use our methods
for reasoning about constitutive norms and they are not able to take
constitutive norms into account.
Norm-Realistic These agents are Normative BDI agents that use our
methods for reasoning about constitutive norms and they are able to
take constitutive norms into account. Therefore, they can determine the
truth-value of institutional facts according to their observations and the
inferences that they made by means of constitutive norms. These agents
are norm-realistic and give more priority to the information that they
infer, when they are able to both observe and infer the truth-value of
an institutional fact.
Observation-Realistic These agents are quite similar to norm-realistic
ones. However, they give more priority to the information that they
observe, when they are able to both observe and infer the truth-value
of an institutional fact.
In each experiment we create one agent of each type, thus a total of three
agents.
After the deliberation phase, we inspect the agent beliefs to determine
which of the institutional facts are believed to be true or false accord-
ing to the information that each agent has (this corresponds to the in-
struction named Inspection on Algorithm 3). As aforementioned, the BDI
agents used in this paper use graded logics to represent mental proposi-
tions. Thus, they have graded beliefs that represent their knowledge about
the institutional state. In general, when a belief about a proposition has
a low certainty, then the agent considers that the proposition is false. In
this experiment, we assume that institutional facts are false when their
certainty is lower than an internalization threshold (δinternalization).
Since the different types of agents carry out a different reasoning pro-
cess, we have to determine the most suitable values for the internalization
threshold (δinternalization) for each agent type. To this aim, we have per-
formed a set of previous experiments varying the value of the threshold. In
each of the previous experiments, a set of three agents (one agent of each
type) are informed about 20 constitutive norms. In each iteration, agents
perceive their environment and determine (i.e., conjecture) which institu-
tional facts hold and which ones not. The conjecture made by agents is
compared against the institutional state and the number of TP, TN,FP
and FN is updated accordingly. The experiment is executed during 400
steps. Once the experiment ends we calculate the MCC achieved by each
agent type. For each value of the threshold we have performed 1000 exper-
26 N. Criado et al.
0	  
0.1	  
0.2	  
0.3	  
0.4	  
0.5	  
0.6	  
0.7	  
0.05	   0.15	   0.25	   0.35	   0.45	   0.55	   0.65	   0.75	   0.85	   0.95	  
NON-­‐NORMATIVE	   NORM-­‐REALISTIC	   OBSERVATION-­‐REALISTIC	  
Fig. 4 MCC (Y axis) with respect to the internalization threshold (X axis).
iments. Figure 4 shows the MCC obtained on average in the 100 experi-
ments by each agent type with respect to the value of δinternalization. As
illustrated by Figure 4, the best results of non-normative agents are ob-
tained when δinternalization is 0.5, the best results of norm-realistic agents
are obtained when δinternalization is 0.4, and the best results of observation-
realistic agents are obtained when δinternalization is 0.45. In the rest of the
experiment types, we have fixed the internalization threshold to the values
that allow each agent type to obtain its best results.
3. Decision Making. In this phase, agents generate intentions to execute one
plan that achieves one or more desires. For simplicity, agents select ran-
domly one action to be executed in each step of the experiment29.
7.2 Results
We have performed 3 different experiment types to illustrate the performance
of our methods for reasoning about constitutive norms with respect to: (i)
number of steps that the experiment is executed, (ii) the visibility of the
institutional state, and (iii) the opacity of the environment. The results of
these experiment types are described below.
7.2.1 Number of Steps
This experiment is aimed at determining the number of steps that the simula-
tor must be executed to obtain stable results (i.e., results in which the MCC
29 Note that this experiment is aimed at evaluating the performance of our proposal for
reasoning about constitutive norms when agents keep track of the institutional state. Thus,
the functionality in charge of updating the agent desires and carrying out the decision
making phase has been simplified in the simulator (i.e., agents select the next action to be
executed randomly).
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does not vary much). Moreover, this experiment demonstrates that in a typical
situation30 our proposal allows agents to keep track of the institutional state
with more precision.
Figure 5 illustrates the MCC achieved per each agent type on average
with respect to the number of steps that the experiment is executed. The
error bars represent the 95% confidence interval for the MCC obtained in
the experiments. Non-normative agents keep track of the institutional state
with less precision. On average, the MCC obtained by non-normative agents
is 0.23. This is explained by the fact that they can only determine the truth-
value of institutional facts when they are able to observe it. On the contrary,
agents that use our proposal for reasoning about constitutive norms are able
to keep track of the institutional state with more precision. Specifically, the
MCC obtained by norm-realistic and observation-realistic agents is 0.49 and
0.59, respectively. The improvement on the MCC achieved by norm-realistic
and observation-realistic is 112.38%31 and 154.91%, respectively. In light of
these results, we can conclude that agents that use our methods for reasoning
about constitutive norms attain a significant improvement in this experiment.
From 400 steps, the results achieved, in terms of the average MCC and the
95% confidence intervals for the MCC, remain quite stable. For this reason,
we have fixed the number of steps to 400 in the following experiment types32.
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Fig. 5 MCC (Y axis) achieved per agent type with respect to the number of steps that
the experiment is executed (X axis). The error bars (Y axis) represent the 95% confidence
interval for the MCC obtained in the experiments.
30 A typical situation is when most of the institutional facts are not visible (i.e. when
visibility = 0.25) and the variance of the noise that affects agent observations is half of the
agent accuracy (i.e., when opacity = 0.5)
31 The improvement on the MCC is calculated as (0.49− 0.23)/0.23× 100 = 112.38%
32 Note that in the following experiment types the 95% confidence intervals for the MCC
are quite small and we have preferred not to draw them.
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7.2.2 Visibility of Institutional State
With this experiment we aim to demonstrate that agents that consider the in-
formation that is inferred from reasoning about constitutive norms keep track
of the institutional state with more precision, even if agents can perceive the
institutional facts. Specifically, this experiment illustrates the performance of
the different agent types when the visibility of the institutional state changes.
Moreover, we have determined which type of normative agent is more suitable
according to the visibility of the institutional state.
As explained before, the visibility of the institutional sate is simulated by
the probability in which the truth-value of any institutional fact is observed.
In this experiment we analyse the MCC achieved by each agent when the
probability of observing institutional facts varies within the [0, 1] interval.
Figure 6 illustrates the MCC achieved per each agent type on average
with respect to the probability that the truth-value of any institutional fact is
observable. In this picture we can observe that the MCC achieved by norm-
realistic agents is not affected by the visibility of the institutional facts. This
is due to the fact that norm-realistic agents consider that the information that
is inferred has more priority than the information that is already believed. In
our simulator there is one constitutive norm per each institutional fact, then
norm-realistic agents are able to infer from constitutive norms the truth-value
of all institutional facts. As a result the performance of norm-realistic agents
is not affected by the visibility of institutional facts. In contrast, the MCC
achieved by observation-realistic and non-normative agents increases linearly
with the visibility. Since non-normative agents only can determine the truth-
value of institutional facts on the basis of their observations, and thus they are
the most affected by the visibility of institutional facts (i.e., the slope of the
line that represents the MCC achieved by non-normative agents is higher).
When the probability is very low (i.e., visibility  0.1), then observation-
realistic and norm-realistic agents achieve the best results. In this case, agents
are not able to observe the truth-value of almost any institutional fact and
they only have the information that they can infer from constitutive norms.
Therefore, observation-realistic and norm-realistic behave similarly. As the
probability increases, then more institutional facts can be observed and the
performance of both observation-realistic and non-normative agents gets bet-
ter. Specifically, observation-realistic agents achieve the best results, when the
probability is within the interval [0.05, 0.95]. When the truth-value of all the
institutional facts can be observed (i.e., when the probability is 1), then non-
normative and observation-realistic agents achieve the best results. In this
case, observation-realistic agents behave as non-normative agents. In this sit-
uation, our methods for reasoning about constitutive norms are not necessary
since agents are able to observe the institutional state completely and there is
no need for reasoning about constitutive norms.
In light of these results, we can conclude that observation-realistic agents
are the most suitable ones. They behave as norm-realistic when their institu-
tional state is not visible and they rely on the inferences that they made from
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constitutive norms. However, when the institutional state is visible, observation-
realistic agents behave as non-normative agents and rely on their observations.
When the institutional state is partially visible, observation-realistic agents
combine both information that is inferred from norms and information that is
observed and they achieve the best results. Thus, we demonstrate that agents
that make use of our proposal for reasoning about constitutive norms obtain
the best results whatever the visibility of institutional facts is.
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Fig. 6 MCC (Y axis) achieved per agent type with respect to the visibility of institutional
facts (X axis).
7.2.3 Opacity of the Environment
In our proposal, agents make use of their perceptions to: (i) update their
beliefs; and (ii) reason about constitutive norms and infer beliefs and desires
about the institutional state. Given that in our proposal agents make a further
use of their perceptions, it may be argued that our proposal makes agents
more sensitive to the precision of these perceptions. In this experiment we
aim to demonstrate that agents that consider the information that is inferred
from constitutive norms are similarly affected by the precision of perceptions.
Specifically, this experiment illustrates the performance of the different agent
types as the opacity of the environment increases and the environment becomes
more and more difficult to discern.
As explained before, the opacity of the environment determines the diffi-
culty to observe the environment. It has been modelled by the opacity coeffi-
cient that is shared by all agents and determines the magnitude of the error
made by all agents when they observe the environment33.
33 Note that the observation of the environment includes the observation of the brute
facts and those institutional facts that are visible. The more opaque the environment is, the
30 N. Criado et al.
Figure 7 illustrates the MCC achieved per each agent type on average with
respect to opacity of the environment. In all agent types the MCC decreases
as the opacity of the environment increases. In light of these results, we can
conclude that the opacity of the environment affects all agent types in a similar
way. Thus, observation-realistic agents obtain the best results regardless of
the opacity of the environment. This is explained by the fact that the opacity
determines the precision of observations about institutional and brute facts.
The observations about institutional facts are used by all agents to determine
the truth-value of institutional facts. The observations about brute facts are
used by norm-realistic and observation-realistic agents when they reason about
constitutive norms to determine the truth-value of institutional facts. Thus, all
agent types use observations to keep track of the institutional state somehow
or other. As a consequence, all agent types are affected by the opacity of the
environment.
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Fig. 7 MCC (Y axis) achieved per agent type with respect to the opacity of the environment
(X axis).
7.3 Discussion
As shown in the results provided in this section, the methods for reasoning
about constitutive norms proposed in this paper allows agents to keep track
of the institutional state with more precision. Besides that, we have demon-
strated that observation-realistic agents are the ones that keep track of the
institutional state with the highest precision. This is explained by the fact
less precise the observations about brute and institutional facts are. Because of this, both
non-normative and normative agents are affected in the same way by the opacity of the
environment.
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that observation-realistic agents are able to adapt their behaviour; i.e., they
behave as norm-realistic agents when the institutional state is not visible,
they behave as non-normative when the institutional state is visible, and they
combine the information that they observe and infer from constitutive norms
when the institutional state is partially visible. Finally, we demonstrate that
our agents are the ones that keep track of the institutional state with the
highest precision regardless of the opacity of the environment.
8 Conclusions
As mentioned before, the role of constitutive norms on agent reasoning pro-
cesses is an open problem that has been identified by previous proposals, but
that has not been faced yet. To address this problem, in this paper we propose
an information model, knowledge representation and an inference mechanism
for reasoning about constitutive norms in BDI agents. Our proposal considers
that agents have a physical presence in some real-world environment. Agents
have a partial and uncertain knowledge of it. The main aim of our proposal is
to endow agents with capabilities for reasoning about constitutive norms and
being able to know the institutional repercussions of their actions. We have
provided a classification of the different agent types that can be developed
with our proposal. Moreover, we have also shown how our proposal works in
a case study. Finally, we have carried out an experimental evaluation of the
performance of our methods for reasoning about constitutive norms and the
results are shown in this article.
The set of constitutive norms considered by an agent might be in conflict,
since agents belong to different institutions simultaneously. Thus, the devel-
opment of mechanisms for resolving conflicts and inconsistencies among con-
stitutive norms is an interesting issue that will be addressed in future work.
Another interesting line of future work is the interpretation of constitutive
norms. In this article we assume that norms are unambiguously interpreted
by agents. However, in environments that are populated by heterogeneous
agents, agents might give different interpretations to constitutive norms and,
as a consequence, inconsistencies and conflicts may arise (e.g., agents may
consider that a constitutive norm is relevant in different contexts).
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